In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military. — Douglas MacArthur, 1933
Military doctrine and training have not kept pace with the ever-quickening pace of technology or character of war. Most of it is only updated every few years and not uniformly across the sea services or military, let alone our partners. Changes in training and doctrine try to reflect the changes in technology, modern tactics, combat operations, and new strategies, but lack agility. Learn more here.
The Navy Warfare Development Command’s logo captures well how the Navy is trying to address training problems in a holistic fashion developing doctrine and concepts from experimentation, war games, operational level training and exercises. These actions seek to address the central dilemma of rapid doctrinal development in a constantly changing threat environment. Add to these challenges the reality that any doctrinal breakthroughs must be inculcated within the maritime and Joint Forces. Learn more here.
From undersea to outer space and from microelectronics to nuclear missiles, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have always strived to improve warfighting capabilities at every level. The Office of Naval Research (ONR), Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) and the Coast Guard’s Research and Development Center (RDC) all act as the primary organizations performing research, development and testing of new concepts. Their work is fundamental to America’s maritime dominance now and in the future. Resourcing of these organizations and the Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) is vital to continuing to discover and deploy new capabilities to the fleet. Learn more here.
How well do our men and women understand today’s doctrine and concepts? Do they have adequate training to implement these at the strategic, operational or tactical level? How do they effect our partners and allies? Do we have more doctrine than we can afford? These are questions that sea service leaders must address. In addition to weaving these doctrines together in a coherent manner, something that our sea service leaders are doing to the best of their ability, what is still needed are the resources to make them real. Learn more here.
This section provides a number of possible opportunities for accelerating and improving training, experimentation, and doctrine. Some of these opportunities include increased use of virtual trainers, coordinated training across the sea services, and increased use of robotic and autonomous systems. Learn more here.
In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.—Douglas MacArthur, 1933
Military doctrine and training have not kept pace with the ever-quickening pace of technology or character of war. Most of it is only updated every few years and not uniformly across the sea services or military, let alone our partners and allies. Changes in training and doctrine try to reflect the changes in technology, modern tactics, combat operations, and new strategies, but lack agility. It is also imperative that our sea services consider the differences in learning styles between generations. Training Gen Z will require a different approach than previous generations and this means investments in technologies like Live Virtual Constructive training (LVC), On-Demand Training (ODT), and Ready Relevant Learning (RRL). These are just a few of the concepts that our military has been striving to advance to better prepare our men and women in uniform.
The Navy Warfare Development Command’s logo captures well how the Navy is trying to address such training problems in a holistic fashion developing doctrine and concepts from experimentation, war games, operational level training and exercises. These actions seek to address the central dilemma of rapid doctrinal development in a constantly changing threat environment. Add to these challenges the reality that any doctrinal breakthroughs must be inculcated within the maritime and Joint Forces. A few key points for consideration and understanding are highlighted below in the areas of Training, Experimentation and Doctrine/Concept development.
It has always been the case that those who prepare poorly for battle, or even for peacetime operations, suffer the most. This was evidenced by Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine in which superior numbers were meant to overcome shoddy training and preparation (it didn’t work). Sailors, Sentinels, and Marines must maintain a rigorous, comprehensive training regimen to ensure that ships, aircraft, and submarines are prepared to deploy on schedule and all personnel are ready to carry out their duties in both peace and war. Funding for such efforts has been inconsistent in some cases as the sea services are forced to meet fiscal challenges amid operations, maintenance, and sustainment priorities. Additionally, they have to be prepared to operate ever more seamlessly across the full range of military operations from peacetime defense of maritime trade (as seen in the Red Sea where U.S. naval vessels continue to counter Houthi drone and missile attacks on commercial shipping) to full scale conflict. After decades of relative peace in the global sea lanes, the possibility of maritime conflict with a great power rival is now an ever-present reality.
To be ready for multiple conflict scenarios, at least three things must be prioritized to enhance the preparation and training of the force:
Coordinate training across the sea services so each day at sea or in the littorals can be used to develop servicemembers, as well as gain vital information and operational insights across most of the force. This means each of the training organizations for the separate sea services must be resourced to not only provide the best in basic phase training but also intermediate and advanced, on an ongoing basis.
The role of Virtual/Simulated training also needs to be increased. The services have begun to invest in LVC and other types of virtual trainers to get the warfighters better prepared for high end combat operations. The resources for this should be significantly increased so that every Sailor, Sentinel, and Marine experiences the most realistic training possible before they deploy into harm’s way.
Joint & Combined Training must be enhanced. Once our men and women have completed basic levels of training to understand their platforms, systems and sensors, training across the Joint Force and with key partners must begin in earnest. With the real threat of a long-term conflict with a great power rival, joint forces and allied forces must be at the top of their game and ready to defeat a sizable opponent. This requires an incredible amount of preparation that can only come from greater coordination gleaned from increased collaborative training operations.
The history of experimentation in the sea services is long and impressive. From undersea to outer space and from microelectronics to nuclear missiles, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have always strived to improve warfighting capabilities at every level. The Office of Naval Research (ONR), Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) and the Coast Guard’s Research and Development Center (RDC) all act as the primary organizations performing research, development and testing of new concepts. Their work is fundamental to America’s maritime dominance now and in the future. Resourcing of these organizations and the Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) is vital to continuing to discover and deploy new capabilities to the fleet. A few of the more important areas of focus are as follows:
Enhance and expand experimentation programs. DoD has already begun to drive funds to increase the number and types of experiments being done across the military through the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) program. Similarly, the Navy’s Office of Naval Research Global (ONRG) Experimentation and Analysis (E&A) builds and maintains relationships between Naval operational forces and the Naval Research Enterprise (NRE) to facilitate, fund, and execute experimentation and efforts.
Revive war-gaming. Wargames help leaders challenge assumptions and conventional wisdom; they are an essential part of the policy and strategic planning processes. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti hosted the CNO Futures Game at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, July 16-17. Franchetti emphasized the need for leaders across the Joint Force to think, act, and operate differently, and seek ways to integrate conventional capability with hybrid, unmanned, and disruptive technologies. Similarly, The Coast Guard’s strategic gaming and planning efforts are making waves. Helmed by the Office of Emerging Policy and Strategic Foresight (DCO-X), Project Evergreen is the Coast Guard’s perennial strategic foresight program. It is chartered to highlight long-term risks and opportunities across many plausible futures over a rolling 20-year timeframe. DCO-X uses workshops (called “pinecones”) to both explore and communicate the impacts of these plausible futures to the Service. One innovative product from Project Evergreen is the Paratus Futurum strategic wargame, which allows for greater analysis and preparation for potential future scenarios that the Coast Guard is likely to encounter.
Link experimentation across the Sea Services. Experiments and wargaming activities such as those described above should be shared experiences across the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. The increasingly complex threat environment will require joint operations across the sea services which means that training must address this reality.
Augment modeling and simulation (M&S) tools and infrastructure with artificial intelligence (AI). Every aspect of human endeavor is being impacted by the use of AI. Every one of us needs to have at least an understanding of how it works and what its capabilities are. There is no area in which this is more important than in M&S and the infrastructure that it models. Digital twins are popping up across industry and government to help leaders make better data driven decisions by understanding the interconnections between and among activities and systems. The sea services will depend on AI in an exponentially increasing manner as decision making time continues to shrink and data inputs become too rapid for human understanding.
Increase the use of robotic and autonomous systems (RAS). CNO’s Project 33 highlights the emphasis the Navy will be placing in its investments in RAS under, on and above the waves. America cannot out-manufacture our competition and our challenges to recruiting/retaining the force are well known. To sustain our nation’s maritime advantage and better meet the growing demands of the Combatant Commanders, more RAS is needed. Task Force 59 in the Middle East and Task Force 49 in the SOUTHCOM AOR are just the beginning of what is needed to compete.
Naval doctrine is vast and growing as more and more technologies are introduced to the Fleet. The Department of the Navy’s FY 2024 President’s Budget request was $255.8 billion, an increase of $11.0 billion from the FY 2023 enacted budget (with supplementals). The budget request reflects the nation’s priorities, guided by a hierarchy of strategic doctrines. The list below of current doctrines and concepts underpins the work the sea services are doing to organize itself for various warfighting scenarios. These are good but struggle to keep pace with the threats, the changing nature of war, and technology. How well do our men and women understand today’s doctrine and concepts? Do they have adequate training to implement these at the strategic, operational or tactical level? How do they affect our partners and allies? Do we have more doctrine than we can afford? These are questions sea service leaders must address. In addition to weaving these doctrines together in a coherent manner, something our sea service leaders are doing to the best of their ability, what is still needed are the resources to make them real.
Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP-1)
Force Design 2030 (USMC)
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (USMC)
Doctrine for the US Coast Guard, Pub 1 (USCG)
Tri-Service Maritime Policy (USN)
Distributed Maritime Operations (USN)
Joint Warfighting Concept 3.0 (classified)
Coordinate training across the sea services.
Increase the role of virtual/simulated training.
Enhance joint and combined training among services and allies.
Enhance and expand experimentational training programs.
Revive wargaming.
Link experimentation across the sea services.
Augment modeling and simulation (M&S) tools and infrastructure with artificial intelligence (AI).
Increase the use of robotic and autonomous systems (RAS).
