It has become clear that adversaries across the board have invested in symmetric and asymmetric capabilities at scale to effectively challenge the U.S., its partners, and its allies. Conversely, the U.S. manufacturing and industrial base is unable to match the capacity of adversaries, such as China, to manufacture new military equipment, especially those ships, aircraft, and weapons systems that would confront our maritime forces.
The conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and in the Red Sea have provided strong indications and warnings related to the sectors where the U.S. needs to invest to ensure the ability to manufacture critical lethal and non-lethal weapons systems. This, coupled with the clear trajectory of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to expand their total capability and capacity to outproduce the U.S. (along with its allies and partners) in the construction of domain lethal/non-lethal weapons systems is a cause for grave concern. These trends will not improve in the near-term or be rectified in the long-term without substantial investment by the naval services, other executive branch departments, and Congress across both the defense and commercial industrial sectors. Learn more here.
Department of Defense (DoD) goals to leverage regional sustainment frameworks with allies and partners to conduct “maintenance, repair, and overhaul forward” will not substitute for lack of domestic investment. Trends in manufacturing technology and workforce demographics are leading to the inescapable conclusion the U.S. maritime community must incorporate technologies within the organic industrial base (OIB) as well as encourage collaborative investment with other cabinet-level agencies to ensure the capacity of industry to support national defense requirements. This section provides cross-cutting recommendations that can be applied to the DIB and the service-level OIB for capabilities that support both industry and military maintenance and production centers. These recommendations relate to:
Additive Manufacturing
5G and NextG Connectivity
Mixed Reality Technology
Human and machine teaming through robotics, autonomy, and artificial intelligence
At sea repairs and maintenance
Learn more here.
The mix of advanced weapons needed in the current threat environment run the gamut from lethal and nonlethal, high-end and low-cost (attritable), offensive and defensive. The U.S. must deter escalation from below the threshold of armed conflict while demonstrating capacity to deliver overwhelming lethal force when deterrence fails.
Adversaries are not exclusively dwelling on the use of lethal systems to apply coercive force in the pursuit of their ambitions. Their non-lethal means and methods are highly effective in enabling them to achieve influence over territory or disrupt our allies and partners’ access to their maritime claims.
Adversaries are not relying on expensive high-end weapon technologies. We can see from engagements in the Red Sea that expensive American missile defense systems countering low-cost Houthi drone attacks is not a sustainable system.
And adversaries are increasing the scope of offensive operations across the information, communications, and electronic warfare domains, alongside threats to space assets.
The force must be capable of addressing those adversaries across the complete spectrum of their operations, above and below the threshold of traditional armed conflict, with lethal and non-lethal means achieving decisive effects both physical and non-physical. This section also delves into the most critical considerations for both offensive and defensive technologies. Learn more here.
Since the unfortunate collisions of the USS Fitzgerald and the USS McCain in separate incidents in 2017, there has been a growing awareness of the reduced industrial capacity of the U.S. to produce and repair vessels for service.[1] This has been accompanied by a larger acknowledgement of the lack of industrial capacity in the U.S. to maintain the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) as the nation examines its ability to succeed against peer adversaries.[2] The naval services have received conspicuous criticism from Congress on their shipbuilding practices from design to manufacture followed closely by a lack of preparedness to ensure resilient supply chains to maintain the force during armed conflict scenarios.[3]
The conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and the Red Sea have provided strong indications and warnings related to the sectors where the U.S. needs to invest to ensure the ability to manufacture critical lethal and non-lethal weapons systems.[4] This, coupled with the clear trajectory of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to expand its total capability and capacity to outproduce the U.S. (along with its allies and partners) in the construction of domain lethal/non-lethal weapons systems is a cause for grave concern.
These trends will not improve in the near-term or be rectified in the long-term without substantial investment by the naval services, other executive branch departments, and Congress across both the defense and commercial industrial sectors. Compounding these problems are the demographic and workforce trends impacting the sufficiency of personnel to maintain the ecosystem of industries and military positions vital to the maritime enterprise from the battle fleet through the support vessels to maintain the force.[5] Ultimately, these recommendations for industrial technology and weapons procurement are not only considered feasible and attainable but are assessed to be vital to ensuring the health of the maritime enterprise to meet its role in defense of the nation and its interests.
This section is not a total diagnosis of all the industrial base challenges affecting the national security maritime enterprise. The focus is to simply identify and isolate investments helpful to mitigating the trends noted in the introduction. It is essential to consider investments that mitigate the current imbalance in capacity and capability of the industrial base as well as buy time for long-term solutions to reverse the trends noted above and deliver on their promise of exponential change in productivity and quality. Further, these investments can substantially improve the posture of the force to balance the resources to maintain current readiness and sustain progress toward future readiness.[6] These are cross-cutting recommendations that can be applied to the DIB and the OIB for capabilities that support both industry and military maintenance and production centers.
DoD goals to leverage regional sustainment frameworks with allies and partners to conduct “maintenance, repair, and overhaul forward” will not substitute for lack of domestic investment.[7] Trends in manufacturing technology and workforce demographics are leading to the inescapable conclusion that the U.S. maritime community must incorporate technologies within the OIB as well as encourage collaborative investment with other cabinet-level agencies to ensure the capacity of industry to support national defense requirements. The wave of “smart manufacturing”[8] is the next iteration of industrial practices that when supported by investment will allow unprecedented collaboration and synergy between the maritime services and the industries that support them.
From printing one-of-a-kind parts to enabling rapid, on-site repairs, additive manufacturing (AM) is disrupting the manufacturing base in positive and hopeful ways. Innovations in material and process have opened new possibilities, which in turn are fueling greater interest in technology. The military and industry are betting on its potential to solve long-standing supply chain issues.[9] Despite steady progress to introduce micro-manufacturing aboard ships and ashore installations, the failure to scale with AM over the last 10 years has been an issue.[10] Challenges remain in achieving authority to operate on networks for printers and supporting systems, sufficient network connectivity and speeds, licensing of parts from manufacturers, ensuring the quality of materials to meet military specifications, etc. The technology to manufacture is not at issue, rather it is the lack of addressing the entire approach systemically that has caused delays in achieving the potential for AM to be implemented. The services have all stipulated in testimony that AM will be key in overcoming challenges related to contested logistics at the tactical edge and reducing costs for maintenance and sustainment at home. The investment needs to be made not only in acquiring AM systems and materials, but in enabling manufacturers to license production of key components, the security to protect manufacturing plans and specifications, and in streamlining the authority to place systems on military networks and execute operations using appropriate communications means.[11] This requires a sustained test and digital evaluation process to finally move AM from a potential solution to standard process at scale.
The latest generation of wireless connectivity — 5G — enables data to travel at vastly higher speeds, with near-instant responsiveness, while supporting exponentially more internet of things devices and connections.[12] 5G will soon be superseded by the next generation of wireless communications, or NextG. In this instance, the need for 5G investment enables a range of outcomes for the transmission of data for speed and security.[13] For military industry, supply, and maintenance enterprises the ability to transmit supply requests or support troubleshooting of critical systems by having access to manufacturer support a world away with no latency in communications or data is critical to sustainment and maintenance of the force. Within the skin of a vessel or inside of a warehouse, 5G connectivity enables the introduction of the military internet of things (mIOT) and portable devices (phones, tablets, inventory systems) that will maximize the ability of the force to have needed data and updates that will improve everything from asset visibility to improved maintenance procedures.
The integration of virtual and augmented reality, when available from the same device or platform, is often referred to as “mixed reality” (MR). Regardless of the term, the investment in MR has high potential to improve everything from industrial design, workforce upskilling, and improved execution of production and maintenance operations. Imagine any space on a ship or industrial floor where a service member or worker has on their head, in the form of mixed reality goggles, the full library of information they need to perform a task. Everything from maintenance tutorials, procedure checklists, tool accountability in a format most applicable to them. With the correct investment in 5G/NextG, workers can have persistent communications with master artisans and supervisors interacting with workers across the deckplates or on the shop floor, saving countless hours in lost productivity or efficiency. Further, as demographic shifts impact the nature of the workforce, any worker, regardless of origin or language, can conduct complex operations with their fellow workers as the MR environment compensates for things like language or variables in workforce training standards. Additionally, supervisors can ensure workers have safety requirements overseen and confirmed via virtual inspection conducted at speed based on the capacity of these systems for near simultaneous visual and auditory support.[14] Further, new techniques and procedures can be uploaded instantly to a worker’s display. This ensures servicemembers and industrial workers have the latest in approved methods and can conduct virtual practice prior to actual operation on a physical system. Additionally, with augmented reality features, servicemembers and workers can scan the equipment or system they are working on, and with embedded computer vision (CV) the system can assess anomalies and provide recommended actions. Troubleshooting, manufacturing, or repair of an item can be streamlined, and repair histories and procedures will be immediately logged and visually captured for future assessment if needed. This technology should be as common as a welder’s mask or a mechanic’s common toolkit in the modern era. The ability to improve workforce efficiency, training, and quality are all at hand from a readily available technology.
As demographic trends push changes in the workforce, the services and manufacturing base have seen a decrease in the quantity of workers available and with the propensity to serve in the military or industrial positions. The mitigation to a diminishment in the workforce is to augment the capacity of those who are serving and working with improved technological aids. In this instance the solutions are likely to be found in cross-cutting investments in the application of robotics, autonomy, and artificial intelligence. Specifically, the use of “co-bots” to accompany workers that provide additional support to perform tasks and procedures as directed by a trained worker. This is the man-machine teaming (MUM-T) necessary to improve workforce efficiency and capacity. There is also a need to reduce human involvement and oversite in tasks that can be automated and managed by robotic systems or intelligent networks enabled by autonomous platforms and AI-driven operations. Industrial and military investments in these systems will ensure they are highly compatible and interoperable across the DIB and OIB. Thus, the value is not only magnified but the costs can be ameliorated by widespread government and industrial adoption. Arguably the industrial applications of co-bots and automated supervisory systems are somewhat less challenging than the battlefield applications of MUM-T, which, to conduct offensive, lethal, and network operations, require immediate recognition capability to inform split second discrimination of targets and surrounding objects. By the same token, these systems may support improved industrial safety by having robotic operators conduct certain dangerous tasks or provide secondary confirmation that safety requirements have been met.
It has become clear that adversaries across the board have invested in symmetric and asymmetric capabilities at scale to effectively challenge the U.S., its partners, and its allies. Conversely, the U.S. manufacturing and industrial base is unable to match the capacity of adversaries, such as China, to manufacture new military equipment, especially those ships, aircraft, and weapons systems that would confront our maritime forces. Second only to the decline in U.S. manufacturing is our capacity to conduct at-sea repair and recovery for disabled vessels both in the surface and subsurface fleets. The expected distances that the force will conduct operations will place them far from the industrial facilities and repair yards that are needed to make timely repairs and return a ship to the fight at a time when operations can least accommodate a delay. Few times in history has the need to recover, repair, and return vessels to the fight been so essential to the viability of operational plans. The demand for this capability is not second, but co-equal to the similar needed investment in the logistical support vessels required to refuel and re-arm at sea.[16] This is even more true given the fact that no facilities and ports where naval and MSC vessels would seek repair can be considered permissive and protected from adversary action. As a consequence, this is driving the need for mobile and capable at-sea repair and recovery capability to mitigate the expected lack of access to safe and protected facilities. Further, the lack of investment even in firefighting capability on the water with large volume systems was most evident in the Bonhomme Richard[17] fire in 2020 where the Navy had no firefighting vessel capacity even in its own ports. The need for investment in kinds of vessels and means identified in a 2021 GAO[18] report is essential and should probably be given consideration over some offensive capabilities if the U.S. is to even sustain critical operational plans and maritime campaigns.
Key to properly investing in weapons technology is the understanding there is not a location in the world where the maritime services will operate that is not impacted by threats that can be delivered from all domains. Further, the U.S. must deter escalation from below the threshold of armed conflict while demonstrating capacity to deliver overwhelming lethal force when deterrence fails. This is placing a need for all vessels operating within the fleets and for all bases and stations supporting power projection to possess weapons systems suitable to their role and threats. That changes the scope of consideration for the scale of weapons technology requirements across naval and overall maritime forces. The Navy League concurs with the naval forces investment in weapons systems across all domains and all layers of the maritime environment but adds the following set of considerations to encourage a broader appreciation of the need for lethal and non-lethal weapons systems.
The challenges of industrial capacity and persistent investment necessary for our forces to both replenish current stocks and acquire new capabilities is a paramount challenge.[19] Additionally, our adversaries are dynamically introducing new capabilities or showing accelerated improvement in their existing capabilities. That is compounding the calculus for the speed at which we must invest and the range of systems that must be considered for both offensive and defensive actions.[20]
Adversaries are not exclusively dwelling on the use of lethal systems to apply coercive force in the pursuit of their ambitions. Their nonlethal means and methods are highly effective in enabling them to achieve influence over territory or disrupt our allies and partners’ access to their maritime claims without tipping the balance toward regional or global armed conflict. This deft use of means below the threshold of armed conflict are not ambiguous or benign in their intent to control or seize territory. However, our naval forces are not armed or equipped with nonlethal alternatives that can be applied in those times where physical force is necessary to manage escalation yet that also pre-empt lethal escalation and larger conflict.[21] The ability to proportionately and physically confront malevolent acts short of lethality with a reciprocal and effective non-lethal counterforce is warranted and desired.
Despite the increase in nonlethal engagements being applied against our allies and partners’ naval forces, civilian mariners are becoming increasingly subject to lethal attacks by our adversaries. The actions of Iran and its proxy, the Houthis, in the Red and Arabian Seas have altered the need for Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Maritime Administration (MARAD) vessels to have effective defensive countermeasures for airborne, surface, and subsurface assaults by unmanned and autonomous systems. In an already fraught manpower market to maintain our civilian mariner (CIVMAR) crews, increasing exposure to lethal risk may cause a challenge for recruiting and retention, let alone cripple an already fragile sustainment and supply system which depends on an overstressed and diminishing national security maritime fleet.
Additionally, some of the largest engagements conducted by the battle fleet in recent memory have been primarily defensive in nature supporting air and missile defense against the Houthis and an Iranian-initiated large-scale retaliatory strike against Israel.[22] For the first time since the Vietnam conflict, naval aviators gained “ace” status by engaging unmanned aerial threats launched by Iran.[23] Iran is not only investing in land-based systems but is expected to deploy a ship dedicated to carry unmanned systems similar to efforts reportedly being pursued by Russia and China as well.[24] However, there is a valid criticism that our defensive systems are not only deficient in quantity to continue to respond in this fashion but are economically unworkable in the long run.[25] The need to have a robust, ubiquitous, and economical defense against missile threats and drone swarms is an essential focus in weapons investment over the next five years.
There is a school of thought that a force optimized for high end conventional combat is capable of fighting or deterring all "lesser included" forms of conflict. Thus, it is deemed both the most pragmatic and economical approach to construct a force capable of performing in a least likely/highest risk scenario since those means are universally applicable across the spectrum of conflict. However, peer adversaries do not subscribe to that model, and they have proven repeatedly that theory is ineffective at anything other than conventional armed conflict. PRC application of non-military forces to control access to the South China Sea is a case in point. The force must be more than “combat credible” but rather “conflict credible” forces capable of meeting the nuances of a peer challenger using less-than-lethal capabilities to intimidate allies and partners as well as to control or seize territory.
Peer and near-peer adversaries have all developed similar approaches to challenge the U.S. in the modern era. Everything from long-range precision fires to small boat swarms are common capabilities among the three priority adversaries identified in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. The force must be capable of addressing those adversaries across the complete spectrum of their operations, above and below the threshold of traditional armed conflict, with lethal and non-lethal means achieving decisive effects both physical and non-physical. Further, every vessel in the fleet and every supporting installation must be capable of defense given the fact that there are no truly permissive locations for operations fully removed from the actions of an adversary. The proliferation and effectiveness of cyber, space, and land/maritime unmanned systems create compounding dilemmas for operational forces and critical infrastructure on our installations daily. These are also applicable threats to the civil industrial base but the mitigation of those threats falls out of the purview of this document and engender complex jurisdictional and authority challenges outside periods of national emergency or mobilization.
Investment considerations largely fall under two broad categories of offensive and defensive systems. Recommendations for investment both in research and procurement are the following:
Offensive Systems. As noted previously, the Navy League sees no issues related to the current investment focus areas of the naval services to experiment with and acquire lethal systems across all domains and missions. It is understood the current industrial base will require years to expand to meet the growing demand and to address the replenishment of munitions recently employed from Ukraine to the Red Sea.[26] Therefore, any investments now will take at least 18 to 24 months to implement and likely will not see the first effective surge in production for up to 30 months. Further, the fiscal environment and uncertainty of budgets is requiring an adjustment to weapons and launch platform procurement and a shift to mitigation strategies such as investment in the OSD-led Replicator program. In the end, the issue is not the selection of weapons systems but the need to rectify the industrial base challenges necessary to even begin producing at the scale of need in time to either deter conflict or meet it in the next three 3 to four years.
As important as production of munitions, similarly, is the associated need to address the resilience of supply chain challenges concurrently impacted by long lead times, parts obsolescence, and supplier limitations. These challenges can also have compounding effects on the security challenges presented by having to rely on foreign suppliers, like China, who can compromise our capacity to sustain protracted conflict.[27] The Navy League is also concerned about the under-utilization of multi-year procurement to stabilize demand in the industrial bases, support investment in industrial capacity, and mitigate the effects of inflation on the cost of systems. The Navy League also encourages the increased focus on supply chain resilience in weapons procurement and the actions by the naval Acquisition Enterprise to complete their Wartime Acquisition Sustainment and Support Program (WASSP) and robustly test their feasibility and accuracy.[28] Additionally, the efforts to develop the Regionals Sustainment Framework and cooperative weapons production with allies and partners needs to be vigorously pursued to ensure the ability to prevent adversaries from disrupting weapons-focused supply chains from single points of failure.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and other programs and procedures are important for protecting sensitive U.S. technology and ensure fairness. But they need to be nimbler in the current security environment. The exercise of “maritime statecraft” as encouraged by the secretary of the Navy is essential in this effort to ensure the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard are equipped for the challenges ahead regarding needed weapons systems. This is not only built on steady investment in domestic industry and production but in leveraging the capacity of allies and partners to diversify the locations and means of weapons production.
Drone defense: Defense against unmanned and autonomous systems is clearly a concern for the force and it’s a growing threat daily. Defensive systems need to be considered not just for battle fleet vessels but also for Coast Guard and CIVMAR-crewed vessels. Unlike the layered defense provided to merchant mariners as a part of naval convoys during the WWII era, the ability of the fleet to provide persistent protection of forces from all-domain threats will be challenged by both the capacity of the force but also the expanded means by which drone threats may be delivered. In this instance the investment in solutions such as electronic countermeasures to disrupt drone operations or directed energy weapons (DEW) to damage control surfaces or sensors needs to be accelerated. Although DoD is assessed to invest nearly $1billion annually in directed energy research including high energy lasers (HEL) and high-power microwave systems, the ability to transition from limited prototypes to something that provides competitive and economical options to other kinetic and explosive missile or gun systems is essential. Further, the potential to provide robust defensive systems that also conform to rules of engagement for self-defense while minimizing the risk of collateral harm is beneficial. In this instance they add an ability to defend in close and confined seas or while in port is the utility that directed energy systems bring to the counter-drone defensive capabilities of every vessel in the fleet and provide alternatives to the limited “magazine” of legacy kinetic systems. The lack of requirement to carry live ammunition or provide for the storage of such also has the corresponding potential to ease the burden on supply chains and mitigates the risk of operating in locations where partners or allies may limit the displays of lethal force. Marine Corps investments in similar ground-based systems are considered of equal utility for both point and area defense capabilities as part of an overall ground-based air and missile defense network as evidenced by the battlefield lessons learned in Ukraine. Finally, they are an able alternative for defensive systems necessary for our installations to protect critical infrastructure and prevent harm to the tenant activities on those facilities. The fact that in investment in these systems has broader promise and greater application across the range of platforms and functions in the maritime enterprise also enables collective development opportunities from the contributions of all the services and stakeholders in need of these solutions.
Intermediate force capabilities: Intermediate force capabilities (IFCs) are a range of nonlethal and nondestructive options that can be used to achieve military objectives while limiting harm to people and objects.[29] IFCs can be used in naval and maritime operations to help manage escalation and disrupt instances where adversary tactics and means are clearly evading lethal response but that need intervention with some form of physical force or electromagnetic warfare capability. Most IFCs are simply viewed as handheld and individually employed such as bean bags, rubber bullets, pepper spray, and electric stun guns. NLW are means to reinforce deterrence and expand the range of options available to commanders. They enable the ability to adapt and tailor escalation of force options to the operational environment or preclude the unnecessary application of lethal force by offering an intermediate level of force to fill the gap between presence and lethal effects. The joint force is trained and equipped to provide a primarily binary response employing either lethal force or no force at all. Intermediate force capabilities could provide active measures to use, as needed, when a mission of presence is insufficient or the use of lethal force is undesired or risks unnecessary escalation.[30] IFCs can encompass the disciplines associated with information warfare operations, but in this instance the recommendations here encompass the means to physically intervene to halt the application of nonlethal force often observed by adversaries such as fishing fleet swarms, use of water cannons, boardings conducted with melee weapons. Maritime applications to counter these types of engagements could include:
Long-range acoustic hailers paired with translation devices for clear verbal warnings.
Dazzling lasers for visual warnings and obscuring glare to personnel, windshields, and optics of approaching vessels or unmanned aerial system.
Nonlethal flash-bang warning munitions could be fired directly in front of, or over, vessels instead of using a lethal shot across the bow.
Next-generation high-power radio frequency–directed energy weapons to disrupt electronic controls and shut off vessel engines without harming occupants.
Millimeter wave active denial–directed energy to physically, but nonlethally, repel personnel on approaching vessels.
[1] William R. Hawkins, The Naval Industrial Base Is in Worse Shape Than You Think, Proceedings, August 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/august/naval-industrial-base-worse-shape-you-think
[2] DoD, State of Competition within the Defense Industrial Base, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, February 2022
[3] GAO-24-105503 Report to Congressional Committees Navy Shipbuilding. Increased Use of Leading Design Practices Could Improve Timeliness of Deliveries May 2024 and GAO-24-107488 Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives COAST GUARD ACQUISITIONS Opportunities Exist to Improve Shipbuilding Outcomes May 7, 2024
[4] Cynthia R. Cook, Reviving the Arsenal of Democracy; Steps for Surging Defense Industrial Capacity, CSIS, March 2023.
[5] Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains An action plan developed in response to President Biden's Executive Order 14017, February 2022
[6] https://cimsec.org/are-you-ready-for-this-properly-defining-joint-readiness/
[7] DoD 2024 Regional Sustainment Framework, https://www.acq.osd.mil/asds/docs/RSF-9MAY24.pdf
[8] https://www.rockwellautomation.com/content/dam/rockwell-automation/documents/pdf/campaigns/state-of-smart-2024/9th-annual-state-of-smart-manufacturing-report-en.pdf
[9] https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/7/6/additive-technology-revolutionizes-defense-manufacturing
[10] https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/5/22/navy-expands-additive-manufacturing-aboard-ships
[11] https://dsiac.org/articles/revolutionizing-naval-logistics-the-challenges-and-prospect-of-metal-additive-manufacturing-on-u-s-navy-ship/ & https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/3549430/forging-the-future-how-advanced-manufacturing-is-revolutionizing-marine-corps-l/
[12] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 5G STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN ADVANCING 5G TECHNOLOGY & APPLICATIONS SECURING 5G CAPABILITIES, 2020; https://www.cto.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/DOD-5G-Strategy-Implementation-Plan.pdf
[13]5G & Edge Computing: The Future of the DoD and JADC2 https://www.alsa.mil/News/Article/3433831/5g-edge-computing-the-future-of-the-dod-and-jadc2/
[14] https://www.business.com/articles/virtual-reality-changing-manufacturing/ and https://smarttek.solutions/blog/ar-and-vr-in-manufacturing-use-cases-and-benefits/
[15] GAO, NAVY SHIPS: Timely Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Develop Capabilities for Battle Damage Repair, June 2021
[16] https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/3848484/navy-demonstrates-game-changing-system-to-rearm-warships-at-sea/
[17] https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2816283/navy-releases-extensive-bonhomme-richard-fire-report-major-fires-review/
[18] GAO-21-246 NAVY SHIPS Timely Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Develop Capabilities for Battle Damage Repair, June 2021
[19] https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission.html
[20] https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/news/minority/senate-committee-approves-fy-2025-defense-appropriations-bill & https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Weapons.pdf
[21] https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/learning-in-the-south-china-sea-the-u-s-response-to-the-west-capella-standoff/
[22] https://www.cnn.com/2024/04/14/middleeast/israel-air-missile-defense-iran-attack-intl-hnk-ml/index.html
[23] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-68227200
[24] https://www.marineinsight.com/shipping-news/iran-to-launch-first-drone-carrier-shahdid-bagheri-a-converted-boxship/ & https://www.sandboxx.us/news/china-is-building-the-worlds-first-aircraft-carrier-for-drones/
[25] https://www.csis.org/analysis/cost-and-value-air-and-missile-defense-intercepts
[26] https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106649
[27] https://features.csis.org/preparing-the-US-industrial-base-to-deter-conflict-with-China/
[28] https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/download/240515-guertin-testimony
[29] https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-109/Article/Article/3379342/intermediate-force-capabilities-nonlethal-weapons-and-related-military-capabili/#:~:text=A%20more%20suitable%20option%2C%20intermediate,the%20use%20of%20lethal%20force
[30] https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2497112/beyond-bean-bags-and-rubber-bullets-intermediate-force-capabilities-across-the/
