Since the end of the Cold War, the defense sector has consolidated substantially, transitioning from 51 to 5 aerospace and defense prime contractors. Additionally, there has been an associated net loss of 17,000 Defense sector companies over the last 5 years and a 40% reduction in small business participating in the DIB over the last 10 years.
With the end of the Cold War, America allowed its defense industrial base to atrophy as the likelihood of a resurgent Russia or the rise of a near-peer competitor like China seemed remote. The resulting “peace dividend” saw American priorities shift to other areas while our adversaries expanded their military capabilities and capacity at a rate few thought possible. The consequences have become painfully clear in recent years. China’s shipbuilding capacity far outpaces the United States threatening our maritime interests, while our ability to produce munitions and other military aid needed by allies like Ukraine has slowed dramatically revealing to the world America’s industrial vulnerabilities. Revitalizing our nation’s defense industrial base will require a generational change in thinking, funding, prioritization, and planning. We applaud the recent actions taken by Congress to address this issue, but the severity of the problem will necessitate a whole-of-government response. Learn more here.
The Department of Defense released a first of its kind National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) in January of 2024. The Strategy emphasized four key areas of focus: resilient supply chains, workforce readiness, flexible acquisition, and economic deterrence. The NDIS calls for a fundamental change in the culture of those responsible for setting requirements and for acquiring platforms and systems to meet those requirements. It states clearly that we need to orient acquisition policy for aggressive expansion of production capacity. Learn more here.
“Typical peacetime acquisition reform tends to place more emphasis on greater efficiency, cost effectiveness, transparency, and accountability. Today’s threat environment, however, necessitates acquisition reform that includes efforts to revitalize the defense industrial base, and potentially, rapid expansion to prepare for pacing security challenges. This will require substantial changes to existing acquisition mechanisms.
Correspondingly, there will need to be a change of acquisition mindset that includes increased flexibility and risk tolerances and embracing “fail fast” and similar concepts. Risk aversion must be replaced by aggressive, learning mindsets in both developing and fielding systems underpinned by strong commitments of accountability and responsibility.
Crisis period acquisition policy reform tends to favor better-resourced defense companies. As such, DoD will work to stimulate industry diversification through focused policy directives to help small businesses navigate the complex defense acquisition process.”
-National Defense Industrial Strategy
In addition to the NDIS, the administration has issued two executive orders to formulate action plans to address procurement and maritime industrial base shortfalls. The Navy also established a Maritime Industrial Base Office to oversee the execution of relevant Navy actions. Learn more here.
The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act created a bipartisan, bicameral Commission on the National Defense Strategy. Tasked with identifying current deficiencies in the defense industrial base and providing recommendations for mitigating these deficiencies, the commission released its findings in July 2024. The commission’s report has influenced the language of the 2025 NDAA, allowing for informed policymaking and targeted funding allocations specifically tailored to the industrial base deficiencies outlined by the commission (such as allocating additional funds in the Senate fiscal year 2025 NDAA for the submarine industrial base, replenishment of missiles and torpedoes, and the aircraft carrier program).
“The recommendations throughout this report will require increased resources and the political will to engage internationally that requires the support of a well-informed public. The American people will need to pay for the increases in federal outlays to build the force needed. The American public will have to produce the people to serve in the military, the public sector, and the industrial base. While it is incumbent on political leaders—particularly the President—to make the case for the need for a strong and engaged United States, it cannot be done without the public’s support.”
-Commission on the National Defense Strategy
The current versions of the House and Senate FY 2026 Defense Authorization bills and the corresponding Defense Appropriations bills provide substantial policy support and funding to expedite the resolution of shortfalls, ensuring we are capable of deterring and defeating potential adversaries.
The Navy League of the United States’ Maritime Policy Committee, after exhaustive research into the current deficiencies related to the industrial base, has identified 14 policy prescriptions which could drastically reverse our current dearth of industrial capacity. From Congressional and Executive Branch action, to investment incentives and tax policy, to international industrial alliances and statecraft, these recommendations form the foundation of a new and revitalized American industrial base. Learn more here.
After winning the Cold War, there was an expectation that the United States would no longer need to retain the military and associated industrial base that won that war. For three decades, the U.S. reinvested the peace dividend savings in other priorities. Unfortunately, China spent that time building a first-rate Navy and is now a peer military and economic competitor. And we are facing a resurgent Russian military threat. Deterring these potential adversaries requires rebuilding military capabilities and capacity and the supporting defense industrial base. This will be a massive challenge since the DIB is a small fraction of what it was in 1990 due to procurement and funding policies that didn’t account for the impact on industrial base capacity, both at the prime contractor level and for the supporting supply chains. As a result, we can’t produce sufficient platforms or weapons systems for the sea services on time or within budget to maintain the current force structure or to sustain the services during a protracted conflict. Since the last publication of the Maritime Policy Statement, Congress has recognized this challenge and has appropriated billions of dollars to rebuild the DIB. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Navy also are taking actions to address these issues. However, it will take many years of sustained investment to rebuild. The Navy League applauds and strongly supports continuing and increasing these investments to ensure we have the force structure with the requisite readiness to deter adversaries.
Since the end of the Cold War, the defense sector has consolidated substantially, transitioning from 51 to five aerospace and defense prime contractors. Additionally, there has been an associated net loss of 17,000 defense-sector companies over the past five years and a 40 percent reduction in small businesses participating in the DIB over the past 10 years. As a result, the Defense Department is increasingly reliant on a small number of contractors for critical defense capabilities. Further consolidations would reduce competition, increase costs, and decrease incentives to innovate, which would have serious consequences for national security.
Over the past three decades, the number of suppliers in major weapons system categories has declined substantially. According to the Department of Defense’s State of Competition Within the Defense Industrial Base report, tactical missile suppliers have declined from 13 to three, fixed-wing aircraft suppliers have declined from eight to three, and satellite suppliers have halved from eight to four. Today, 90 percent of missiles come from three sources. As a result, promoting competition and ensuring it is fair and open for future programs is a critical priority.
Additionally, peacetime missile and precision munition production capacity has been funded at such an inadequate rate that it would take years to replace expected consumption in the first few weeks of a future major conflict, just as it took several years to replace the Tomahawks used during the Gulf War. However, in contrast to conflicts since the end of the Cold War, future protracted conflicts with a peer competitor will be subject to contested supply chains, and we won’t be able to wait years for weapons resupply. We must build up stocks of critical weapons as soon as possible and develop secure means of resupply in addition to establishing the ability to rapidly generate additional production capacity to meet demands after wartime reserve stocks are consumed.
As for the shipbuilding industrial base, 14 U.S. shipyards that constructed ships for the Navy have closed since the 1960s, and three have left the defense industry. Only one new shipyard has opened. As a result, just eight shipyards, owned by five prime contractors, build large Navy warships and Coast Guard cutters today.
Among the seven large Navy shipyards, ship-class specialization is the norm. The lack of competition has resulted in shipbuilding costs exceeding inflation so that fewer ships can be acquired annually even if annual appropriations increase in step with inflation. A similar situation can be found in the tactical aviation industrial base.
The number of Navy shipbuilding suppliers for nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers dropped by more than two-thirds over the past 25 years. More than 65 percent of remaining suppliers are the only source for their product. This sharp contraction occurred after the Navy dropped from procuring four submarines a year from 1977 through 1996 to just one submarine a year from 1998 through 2010 (except zero submarines being procured in 2000). The submarine industrial base has lost thousands of suppliers since the Cold War and must expand to address the current requirement to deliver 2.3 boats per year. Submarines have unique requirements of stealth, endurance, and survivability that have no commercial equivalency. This requires a robust industrial base with unique capabilities.
The commercial shipbuilding industrial base also has similar concerns. Several of the larger classes of surface combatant and auxiliary ships have been built in only one or two shipyards. As a result, price and technical competition are limited, and the ability to increase production to meet future requirements is constrained without major infrastructure investments. Low throughput rates have also caused major cost increases from domestic suppliers, which also may need financial support to ensure domestic or allied sources of critical components and weapon systems.
The ship repair industrial base presents its own set of problems. The Navy’s four government-owned shipyards are incapable of keeping up with the current nuclear ship repair demand, and they need major capital investments to upgrade infrastructure and modernize workflows. Also, additional drydocks are needed, and some must be upgraded to accommodate the large Virginia payload module and Columbia-class submarines. To address these deficiencies, the Navy established the Submarine Infrastructure Optimization Program, initially programming $21 billion in expenditures over 20 years. However, recent bids indicate that much more funding will be needed, and the likelihood of increased submarine production will require acceleration of this effort. The movement of some nuclear ship repairs to commercial yards has not gone as planned, and it will require additional time and expense before they can accommodate the additional workload. Conventional ship maintenance repair has been hampered by the lack of dry-dock facilities, especially on the West Coast. Investment to expand such capabilities will require new acquisition strategies that ensure stable workloads to justify such expenditures.
While the shipbuilding industrial base is probably in the worst shape, other segments of the defense industry also require accelerated focus and support. Pressing challenges include reducing reliance on foreign and single-source suppliers for critical materials, replacing obsolete parts on weapon systems that could be in operation for decades, and protecting weapon systems from cybersecurity threats, among others.
We must do more to protect the intellectual property developed by our industrial base so that the technical edge it provides, including directed energy, artificial intelligence, and hypersonics, is not stolen by our adversaries through cyberattacks or industrial espionage. Our technological edge must be maintained since we no longer have the capacity edge in numbers of missiles, aircraft, or ships.
Below is more detail on the severity of the problem. Since the National Defense Industrial Strategy and other passages below do not specifically address the defense industrial base, including the Marine Transportation System, the U.S.-flag Merchant Marine is addressed in a separate section, and the MTS is included before the recommendation in this section.
To rebuild the industrial base upon which the sea services depend requires a long-term strategy and associated resources to implement that strategy. The first such strategy was released in January 2024 and provides a comprehensive framework to restore the defense industrial base. Rather than repeat that entire document, relevant sections pertaining to the sea services will be highlighted. The introductory section of the NDIS is a superb summary of how we got to our current situation and provides the following four priorities as a framework to reverse it.
• Resilient supply chains could securely produce the products, services, and technologies needed now and in the future at speed, scale, and cost.
• Workforce readiness would provide for a sufficiently skilled and staffed workforce that is diverse and representative of America.
• Flexible acquisition would lead to the development of strategies that strive for dynamic capabilities while balancing efficiency, maintainability, customization, and standardization in defense platforms and support systems. Flexible acquisition strategies would result in reduced development times, reduced costs, and increased scalability.
• Economic deterrence would promote fair and effective market mechanisms that support a resilient defense industrial ecosystem among the U.S. and close international allies and partners and economic security and integrated deterrence. As a result of effective economic deterrence, fear of materially reduced access to U.S. markets, technologies, and innovations would sow doubt in the mind of potential aggressors.
As detailed in the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, the PRC is the United States’ pacing challenge. As a means to implement “Economic Deterrence”, DoD must work with Congress, other executive departments and global Allies and partners to eliminate defense industrial dependencies emanating from the PRC. The defense of the nation must not be held at risk by reliance on those who might seek to undermine it.
As the National Defense Strategy (NDS) states, "…we will prioritize coordinated efforts with the full range of domestic and international partners in the defense ecosystem to fortify the defense industrial base, our logistical systems, and relevant global supply chains against subversion, compromise, and theft." The NDIS offers a strategic vision to coordinate and prioritize actions to build a modern defense industrial ecosystem that is fully aligned with the NDS. It also calls for sustained collaboration and cooperation between the entire U.S. government, private industry, and our Allies and partners abroad.
The NDIS calls for a fundamental change to the culture of those responsible for setting requirements and for acquiring platforms and systems to meet those requirements. It states we need to orient acquisition policy for aggressive expansion of production capacity:
“The DoD’s acquisition process is a structured series of steps and activities used to acquire goods and services for the U.S. military. Typical peacetime acquisition reform tends to place more emphasis on greater efficiency, cost effectiveness, transparency, and accountability. Today’s threat environment, however, necessitates acquisition reform that includes efforts to revitalize the defense industrial base, and potentially, rapid expansion to prepare for pacing security challenges. This will require substantial changes to existing acquisition mechanisms. Correspondingly, there will need to be a change of acquisition mindset that includes increased flexibility and risk tolerances and embracing “fail fast” and similar concepts. Risk aversion must be replaced by aggressive, learning mindsets in both developing and fielding systems underpinned by strong commitments of accountability and responsibility. Crisis period acquisition policy reform tends to favor better-resourced defense companies. As such, DoD will work to stimulate industry diversification through focused policy directives to help small businesses navigate the complex defense acquisition process. DoD will work to reform acquisition policies that unnecessarily burden or restrain the nation from rapidly attaining a proper, robust defense production posture while simultaneously fostering supplier diversification with a slate of programs referenced elsewhere in this strategy.”
National Defense Industrial Strategy Implementation Plan 2024
The October 29, 2024, NDIS-IP is the unclassified follow-on document to the NDIS that lays out how the Department of Defense intends to turn that strategy into action. It describes concrete initiatives, lines of effort, risk mitigation, and funding plans and assigns responsibilities. It also flags that there will be a classified annex with additional details. It follows the same four strategic priorities discussed above and provides six implementation initiatives, resource and funding requirements, and associated risks:
Six implementation initiatives
Indo-Pacific deterrence: Expand missile and munitions output, strengthen submarine base, and modernize depots
Production and supply chains: Onshore critical manufacturing, reduce adversary dependencies, stockpile materials, and enhance cyber defenses
Allied and partner collaboration: Co-production (e.g., AUKUS), streamline foreign military sales, and build multinational supply networks
Capabilities and infrastructure: Modernize nuclear and organic industrial facilities, overhaul depots, and expand skilled workforce
New capabilities and acquisition pathways: Accelerate prototyping and fielding and employ flexible acquisition authorities
Intellectual property and data: Secure/manage intellectual property and improve data sharing and analytics for acquisition
Resources and funding
· Estimated need: More than $23 billion in FY 2025-29 for these initiatives
· FY 2025 request alignment: About $38.4 billion already mapped to immediate NDIS-IP actions
· Recent appropriations: About $74.6 billion in FY 2024 in defense industrial base investments (munitions, submarine base, replenishment, facility upgrades)
Risks and challenges
Risks of inaction: Capacity shortfalls, supply vulnerabilities, and erosion of tech advantage
Challenges: Multiyear funding stability, workforce gaps, foreign dependency, infrastructure modernization, and interservice and allied coordination
Executive Order 14265, April 9, 2025, Modernizing Defense Acquisitions and Spurring Innovation in the Defense Industrial Base
This executive order, issued by President Trump, calls for modernizing defense acquisitions and revitalizing the defense industrial base. It emphasizes speed, flexibility, and execution — core themes that align with the 2024 NDIS priorities, including adaptive acquisition and industrial resilience. Here are salient elements of the order for further review:
Sec. 2. Policy.
Sec. 3. Acquisition Process Reform.
Sec. 4. Internal Regulations Review.
Sec. 5. Acquisition Workforce Reform.
Sec. 6. Major Defense Acquisition Program Review.
Sec. 7. Requirements.
Executive Order 14269, April 9, 2025, Restoring America's Maritime Dominance — The White House)
The following executive order focuses on all aspects of the maritime industrial base, including shipbuilding, shipping, and the supporting workforces. Extracts for further review follow:
Sec. 1. Purpose.
Sec. 3. Maritime Action Plan.
Sec. 4.
Sec. 5. Actions in the Investigation of the PRC’s Unfair Targeting of Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors.
Sec. 7. Engage Allies and Partners to Align Trade Policies.
Sec. 8. Reduce Dependence on Adversaries through Allies and Partners.
Sec. 9. Launch a Maritime Security Trust Fund.
Sec. 10. Shipbuilding Financial Incentives Program.
Sec. 12. Report on Maritime Industry Needs.
Sec. 13. Expand Mariner Training and Education.
Sec. 15. Improve Procurement Efficiency.
Sec. 17. Increase the Fleet of Commercial Vessels Trading Internationally under the flag of the United States.
Sec. 18. Ensure the Security and Leadership of Arctic Waterways.
Sec. 19. Shipbuilding Review.
Sec. 21. Inactive Reserve Fleet.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Section 301 Investigation Report on China’s Targeting of the Maritime, Logistics, and Shipbuilding Sectors for Dominance
Section 5 of Executive Order 14269 discusses the actions the USTR is to take regarding the results of its investigation into China’s unfair trade practices in the maritime sector. Background on the investigation, its findings, and actions to be implemented Oct. 14, 2025, are included in a Federal Register announcement from April 23, 2025:
Since this announcement, the USTR has asked for comments on various provisions, and it is expected that there may be some additional minor changes when the duties go into effect Oct. 14, 2025. An impact has already been seen as ocean carriers have attempted to reduce the number of Chinese-operated and -built ships calling U.S. ports.
Department of Navy’s Maritime Industrial Base Office
The MIBO was founded in September 2024 in response to growing strategic competition and the urgent need to revitalize U.S. shipbuilding capacity. It is led by Matthew D. Sermon, who succeeded Jay Stefany as the direct reporting program manager for the maritime industrial base in January 2025.
The MIBO has authority akin to a major Acquisition Category I program despite not being formally categorized as one. It was directed to produce an acquisition strategy and performance metrics within 30 days of its creation and coordinates with the Program Executive Office for Ships, PEO Strategic Submarines, Naval Sea Systems Command, and Naval Reactors to align industrial base efforts.
The MIBO is tasked with strengthening America’s maritime manufacturing capabilities across six strategic lines of effort:
1. Supplier development: Expanding and stabilizing the vendor base for shipbuilding and sustainment
2. Workforce development: Addressing labor shortages and skill gaps through training and recruitment
3. Advanced manufacturing technology: Accelerating adoption of digital tools, automation, and novel materials
4. Strategic outsourcing: Leveraging commercial and allied capabilities to fill production gaps
5. Shipbuilder infrastructure: Modernizing shipyards and dry docks to meet future fleet demands
6. Government oversight: Enhancing program management, metrics, and accountability across the industrial base
The MIBO has initiated over 1,100 investments across 37 states, engaging thousands of suppliers. It supports construction of Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, and more than 10 surface ship classes — a scale not seen since World War II.
The MIBO is closely aligned with the Trump administration’s Executive Order 14265 and is expected to play a central role in implementing the Maritime Action Plan, including public-private partnerships and infrastructure expansion.
The MIBO has launched over 800 initiatives across 38 states, with a focus on revitalizing legacy shipbuilding regions and expanding into new industrial corridors. Key regional highlights include:
Virginia (Hampton Roads and Danville)
· Major investments in submarine and carrier construction via Newport News Shipbuilding
· Danville, Virginia, hosts the Accelerated Training in Defense Manufacturing program — a 16-week course focused on welding, CNC machining, additive manufacturing, and quality control
Connecticut
· Supplier development tied to Electric Boat’s submarine production, especially for Columbia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
· Workforce pipeline partnerships with local technical colleges and universities
Gulf Coast (Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas)
· Infrastructure upgrades at Ingalls Shipbuilding and other surface combatant yards
· Expansion of supplier networks for amphibious transport dock ships, guided-missile destroyers, and auxiliary ship components
Midwest (Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan)
· Advanced manufacturing pilots including robotics and artificial intelligence integration for ship component fabrication
· Outreach to dormant industrial zones for supplier reactivation
Pacific Northwest and California
· Investments in dry dock modernization and sustainment capacity
· Partnerships with academic institutions to reinvigorate naval architecture and marine engineering programs
Nationally, the MIBO has focused on supplier development and technology transition:
· Diversifying critical suppliers to reduce single-point failures
· Transitioning Industry 4.0 technologies (11 pilot projects have introduced additive manufacturing, robotics, and digital twins into vendor workflows)
· Cutting maintenance delays (over 1,300 days saved in FY 2024 alone through additive manufacturing applications)
The MIBO also made investments in workforce pipeline programs to meet the projected demand for 250,000 skilled maritime workers over the next decade by doing the following:
· Establishing six regional and one national talent pipeline programs
· Partnering with K-12, community colleges, and universities to rebuild the maritime trades ecosystem
· Reinvigorating naval architecture and manufacturing engineering degrees through targeted academic collaborations
These billions (more than $8 billion appropriated over the last three years) of investments are not just about shipbuilding — they’re about rebuilding a resilient, distributed, and technologically advanced maritime industrial base. The regional diversity ensures supply chain depth, while the workforce programs aim to reverse decades of attrition in skilled trades.
Although the current administration has not publicly endorsed the previous administration’s NDIS and implementation plan, many of its actions, including Executive Order 14269 and those by the Navy’s MIBO are generally consistent with its tenets, although there is greater emphasis on acquisition reform. Secretary of the Navy John C. Phelan’s recent focus has been fixing the shipbuilding industrial base so that it produces and repairs ships on cost and on time.
WHAT DOES THE NDAA DO TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE?
This bipartisan, bicameral commission was established in the 2022 NDAA to report on the National Defense Strategy. This report has informed the language in the FY2025 NDAA and will produce the basis for future Congressional authorizations and appropriations. The report includes a comprehensive list of deficiencies in the current Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and makes numerous recommendations on how to address them.
The Navy League’s Grassroots Advocacy program will be critical in making the case that the recommendations proposed by the Commission be funded expeditiously.
WHAT DOES THE FY2025 NDAA DO TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE?
As of October 22, 2025, defense funding for FY 26 has not been enacted. Although there was a Continuing Resolution throughout FY 2025, funding was included in the FY 2025 Reconciliation Act for shipbuilding and the maritime/defense industrial bases, including naval munitions. The House/Senate NDAA bills also include substantial language to streamline procurement processes, including organizational changes. The salient changes that appear in the FY 2026 NDAA will be included in the next update.
Congress is providing all the necessary authorities and funding to rebuild the maritime industrial bases. It will take skilled leadership and time to recruit and train the prime and supporting contractor, managerial, and labor forces to produce the required ships and munitions on time.
MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
The U.S. Marine Transportation System consists of waterways, ports, and their intermodal connections, vessels, and vehicles. The more than 40,000 American-built, American-crewed vessels operating in domestic maritime transportation contribute more than $154 billion per year to the U.S. economy. These vessels move more than a billion tons of cargo annually, create over 650,000 jobs, and generate $41 billion in labor compensation, according to the American Maritime Partnership. Additionally, annual taxes generated by the domestic fleet top $16 billion, and any increased revenue should be invested in reducing the billions of dollars in backlogged maintenance to upgrade/replace much of the obsolete and unreliable river lock-and-dam infrastructure. The system can carry huge additional amounts of freight and petroleum products at a fraction of the cost of other transport modes. The American Association of Port Authorities states that in 2024, ports generated 2.5 million jobs, including a million port workers, $214 billion in wages and benefits, and $311 billion in economic activity.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dredging and new construction program funds projects such as a second Poe-sized lock on the Great Lakes, which will prevent a shutdown of the Great Lakes trade and economy if the current single lock fails. Other programs fund the U.S. Coast Guard upgrades to aids-to-navigation in river and harbor channels that connect U.S. ports to the world. The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, resourced from the Harbor Maintenance Tax (fees of about $2 billion a year), was intended to pay for the construction and maintenance of harbor and navigation channels and aids when it was developed in 1986. The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2020 set targets for increasing expenditures by using up the $10 billion surplus by 2030 (amounting to total of $3.15 billion for FY 2025) to reduce billions of dollars in project backlogs, including urgent investments to accommodate the larger ships using the expanded Panama Canal. Additionally, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2022 provides an additional $450 million a year through 2025 for port improvements to counter the impacts of climate change and enhance supply chain throughput and included $2.5 billion in inland waterways projects.
As one of the world’s trade leaders, the United States requires a technologically advanced, secure, efficient, and environmentally sound Maritime Transportation System. Our economic prosperity is dependent on international trade, of which more than 99 percent by weight (excluding Canada and Mexico) moves by water. Roughly $2 trillion of trade flows through U.S. ports. Trade flowing through the nation’s ports and waterways is expected to increase substantially by 2030, creating greater congestion on overburdened land, port, water, passenger, and freight delivery systems. Only a truly seamless, integrated, multimodal transportation system with an expanded AMH system as part of the National Freight Strategic Plan and associated National Maritime Transportation Strategy will meet the nation’s growing needs.
· Continued accelerated and additional funding to address congressional and administration shortfalls identified in the National Defense Industrial Strategy, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, Executive Order 14265, and Executive Order 14269 to provide the capacity to produce major combat and weapon systems to support wartime operations with a peer competitor.
· Sizing the shipbuilding industrial construction and repair base via a national shipbuilding industrial base strategy to meet the aspirational goal of the force structure that the Navy, Coast Guard, and Maritime Administration determine, while acknowledging that the national fleet of the future will include a mix of crewed and uncrewed platforms, and adapt to supporting more distributed operations to take back the initiative in a great power conflict.
· Full funding of the Navy’s shipbuilding plan with stable long-term milestones to ensure the buildup of a more integrated and larger naval fleet in a way that allows the defense industrial base to make long-term investments to accommodate expected growth to counter the challenges from peer competitors such as China.
· Funding the expansion in the number of prime, second-tier, and below competitors (including the initiatives of the Navy’s Maritime Industrial Base Office) to create greater capacity, redundancy, and resiliency to accommodate the capacity buildup and technological innovation necessary to deter and, if necessary, defeat peer competitors.
· Increased and accelerated funding for the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program to ensure the expanded submarine fleet can be properly maintained.
· Full funding of the procurement of sufficient weapons and munitions to meet initial operation plan requirements (war reserve stocks) until mobilized industrial base production can meet consumption demands since today’s inventories are woefully inadequate to counter a peer competitor in a contested environment. Additionally, there has been substantial war-gaming support to justify a recommendation that the Navy fund vertical-launch system rearming capability at sea to allow combatants to remain on station for longer periods.
· Supporting initiatives that will integrate allied capabilities and investments into the naval and maritime shipbuilding construction and repair industrial base, including overseas repairs, as long as such initiatives do not negatively impact the efforts to stabilize and increase domestic shipbuilding.
· A Harbor Maintenance Tax exemption for waterborne cargo shipped between U.S. ports. Taxes should only be paid when imports first land in the United States to eliminate a disincentive for increased domestic waterborne transport.
· Full funding for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dredging and new construction projects at the amount called for in the 2024 Water Resources Development Act and including a record $3.147 billion appropriation from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund for FY 2025 (passed Senate).
· Use of all receipts received in the Inland Waterway Trust Fund to repair/replace aging infrastructure on the inland waterway system.
· Increased investment in maritime research and development on par with other modes of transportation, including novel technologies such as small modular nuclear reactors for ship propulsion.
· Priority access to terminals, vessel berths, and staging areas at the 17 commercial strategic ports for military cargo that support the short-notice military surge deployments under the National Port Readiness Network. Funding for a MARAD program for contingency contracts may be needed to ensure strategic seaports can guarantee access to staging areas, equipment, and facilities to support major force deployments.
· Efforts to develop a national capacity for the Maritime Transportation System to recover from major disruptions to ensure the continuity of key maritime activities. This should include the maintenance of a robust U.S. salvage vessel and oil spill recovery capability to ensure expeditious clearing of vital channels and harbors.
· Increased share of grants for funding intermodal and freight-related maritime projects from provisions in the Infrastructure for Rebuilding America and Better Utilizing Investments to Leverage Development Transportation Discretionary Grants programs. These grants, and the credit assistance provided through the Department of Transportation’s Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act and Railroad Rehabilitation Improvement Financing programs, can help improve the movement of freight through ports and reduce congestion.
