By Andreas Walstad, P&GJ European Correspondent
(P&GJ) – TurkStream is currently the only major functional pipeline supplying Russian pipeline gas to Europe, as other infrastructure has been either damaged or repurposed and transit via Ukraine stopped at the beginning of the year.
The 31 Bcm/a pipeline’s starting point is the Russkaya compressor station near the town of Anapa on the Russian coast from where it stretches over 578-mile (930-km) across the Black Sea before it reaches the receiving terminal near Kiyikoy on the Turkish coast. The offshore component consists of two parallel lines.
From Turkey, the gas is either distributed to Turkish customers or transported to Bulgaria and onward to European customers.
Specifically, from the receiving terminal in Turkey, one of two underground onshore pipelines connections to the existing Turkish gas network at Luleburgaz. The other onshore pipeline continues to the Bulgarian border.
As of early June, the pipeline is flowing gas at nearly full capacity at the border between Turkey and Bulgaria, the Strandzha-Malkoclar entry point, according to transparency data published by ENTSOG – The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas.
However with the European Commission’s proposal to fully phase out Russian gas by 2027, questions concerning its future use are beginning to emerge.
On one hand, the fact that Paul Singer’s hedge fund Elliott Management is reportedly eyeing a stake in the Bulgarian section of the pipeline and has fueled speculation that Russian gas will continue flowing to the EU beyond 2027.
“The future of TurkStream is subject to extraordinary uncertainty, most of all due to the unpredictable trajectory of the war in Ukraine and its impact on Russia’s broader geopolitical and commercial relationships,” Tatiana Mitrova, research fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy told P&GJ.
“There is a wide range of possible outcomes for the pipeline – from renewed strategic alignment between Moscow and Ankara to complete commercial irrelevance.”
TurkStream was announced in 2014 shortly after the South Stream pipeline project was abandoned. South Stream would have transported Russian gas via the Black Sea to Bulgaria and further through Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia to Austria. However, the project was facing obstacles as it was not in compliance with EU regulation, specifically the Third Energy Package, which sets out rules on ownership unbundling and third party access.
Gazprom and Turkish gas company BOTAS signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for TurkStream in December 2014 during Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Turkey. After a few delays and setbacks, notably after the shooting down of a Russian attack aircraft near the near the Syria-Turkey border in November 2015, TurkStream finally began operations in January 2020.
Both Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the inauguration ceremony.
More recently, however, Turkey has signed a number of gas import deals with other suppliers as it is showing a keen interest to reduce its exposure to Russian gas. Turkey imports Russian gas mostly via pipelines and some additional LNG volumes.
In the month of March, the most recent data available from the Turkish energy regulator EMRA, Turkey imported about 1.8 Bcm of piped gas from Russia but not a single LNG cargo.
Contracts to Expire
Mitrova says that, on one end of the spectrum, Russia and Turkey could choose to prolong their gas supply contracts, which are currently set to expire in 2025. Some of that gas could flow to EU countries, potentially labeled as Turkish gas despite the origin being from Russia.
“In that case, Turkey would likely leverage the opportunity to negotiate significantly lower prices [from Russia], using its geopolitical importance and diversified gas supply options as bargaining chips,” she said. “Turkey could then route Russian gas through TurkStream for domestic use, while simultaneously exporting ‘Turkish’ gas – allegedly sourced from the Sakarya field – to European markets. This would allow Ankara to sidestep any EU-level bans on Russian gas.”
In such a scenario, Elliott Management’s interest in the Bulgarian extension of TurkStream would appear commercially rational, as flows would continue under a legally ambiguous but politically tolerated arrangement.
Mitrova noted that Botas has a legacy contract with Russia's Gazprom for 16 Bcm/a delivered via the Blue Stream pipeline that expires at the end of 2025 and has also been importing 5.75 Bcm/a of Russian gas via the TurkStream pipeline under yearly, quarterly and monthly spot deals that also expire at the end of 2025.
However, if Russia refuses to concede on pricing – a possible sign of deteriorating relations with Turkey – the contracts may not be renewed, she adds.
“That would effectively halt gas flows through TurkStream, rendering the pipeline a stranded asset. While this might appear economically irrational for Russia, especially after losing the bulk of its European market, the Kremlin could still prioritize geopolitical signaling over marginal revenues,” said Mitrova.
Meanwhile, Frank Umbach, who is head of Research, European Cluster for Climate, Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS) at the university of Bonn in Germany, says the involvement of a U.S. company in the Nord Stream and Turkstream gas pipelines will not work since the EU is phasing out Russian fossil fuels.
“The overall idea was to create an economic incentive strategy for a peace agreement. But there is no perspective for a real peace agreement in the short term,” he said.
“Repackaging” Russian gas as Turkish or other means to circumvent a ban on Russian gas might also prove difficult, according to Umbach.
“For avoiding circumventing of sanctions and regulations, the EU will also enhance the overall transparency, monitoring and controlling of all energy imports such as for Russian LNG,” Umbach said. “The EU will also initiate new measures for preventing any whitewashing Russian fossil fuel imports.”
This could be, for instance, shifting oil and LNG transports between ships, or mixing fuels in pipelines and declaring it Russian gas for Turkish gas or Turkish blend.
Hungary’s Dependence
In the EU, Hungary and Slovakia – both seen as having strong ties with Moscow – are among the main importers of gas via TurkStream. Although both countries are landlocked, there are options to import gas from other sources, for example, U.S. LNG via the Krk regasification terminal in Croatia or terminals in Poland.
Nevertheless, theoretically, Hungary and Slovakia could be granted a grace period by the EU for additional years before they must stop importing Russian gas, Umbach added. This could support the operations of TurkStream for a longer time.
“Ultimately it depends on the political will in those countries – primarily Hungary and Slovakia – and the need for investments and will of cooperation with the neighbouring countries,” he said.
Meanwhile, Russia has on a number of occasions accused Ukraine of attempting to sabotage TurkStream. In March this year, after an alleged drone attack, Péter Szijjártó, Hungary’s foreign minister, said the pipeline is the guarantee of the security of Hungary’s natural gas supply and that an outage would seriously endanger the country’s energy security.
The minister took to Facebook to say these types of attacks should be considered an attack on the nation’s sovereignty and called on the European Commission to immediately clarify whether it will abide by its guarantee that Ukraine will not attack infrastructure leading to the European Union.
EU Paying More
Cyril Widdershoven, senior fellow at the Cyprus-based Strategy International Think Tank noted that, currently, TurkStream is still a money maker for Russia. The price of the gas sold to Europe and Turkey is higher compared to the gas Russia sells to China, he said.
“Moscow needs all income options, so Putin’s regime will not be willing to throw the gauntlet or make it a stranded asset. It is also still, for Moscow, a power projection option, as it is linked to Turkey and several pro-Russian countries in Europe,” Widdershoven said.
Moreover, the position of several major EU member states, especially France and Germany, is that they are not inclined to phase out Russian gas by 2027, he added. To this end, the EC’s proposal to ban all Russian gas may not find enough support among member states in the Council of the EU to be passed into law.
However, the main question, Widdershoven said, is not if but how much Russian gas will flow to Europe in the future.
“Looking at the status of Russia, its low investments in upstream, most volumes will already be under major pressure,” Widdershoven said, with reference to the potential 2027 ban.
He also notes Turkstream was meant to be a major supporter of Turkey becoming an energy hub to Europe. It now seems that Moscow has told Ankara that it is no longer interested in Turkey becoming an energy hub, Widdershoven said, which gives reasons to expect lower volumes exported from Russia to Europe and potentially an Asian pivot by Russia in the coming two to five years.
Although flows via TurkStream to the EU seems to be on the increase, the pipeline cannot make up for the lost volumes through Nord Stream, Yamal and the Ukraine and the Ukrainian route.
Russia’s share of EU imports of pipeline gas dropped from over 40% in 2021 to about 11% in 2024. For pipeline gas and LNG combined, Russia accounted for about 19% of total gas imports in the EU in 2024, a slightly higher market share than the U.S. at near 17%, according to the European Commission’s most recent gas market report. Europe’s intake of Russian LNG increased in 2024, by 2 Bcm compared with the previous year.
In total, the volume of imported Russian gas from fell from 150 Bcm in 2021 to 52 Bcm in 2024. If TurkStream stops flowing gas to Europe, most of the volumes will likely be replaced by LNG including from the U.S. P&GJ